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Abstract 
 
In the present two experiments we examined whether imposing cognitive load, and 
making the interview setting more mentally taxing, can deter people from lying.  Most 
liars will incorporate as much truth as possible into their story.  When an interview 
setting becomes more difficult, this may result in refraining from lying altogether. 
Eighty-three (Experiment 1) and 80 (Experiment 2) participants took part in a job 
interview, whereby participants in the experimental condition carried out a secondary 
task simultaneously.  In Experiment 1, participants lied less in the experimental 
condition by mentioning job specification criteria they did not possess, but this finding 
was not replicated in Experiment 2. 
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‘Imposing cognitive load’ is an interview technique whereby interviewers make the 
interview setting more demanding through specific instructions such as asking the 
interviewee to recall the event in reverse (chronological) order (Evans, Michael, 
Meissner, & Brandon, 2013; Vrij et al., 2008), maintaining eye contact with the 
interviewer (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010) or to squeeze a spring-loaded handgrip for 
as long as possible (Debey, Verschuere and Crombez (2012).  Research has 
demonstrated that this facilitates lie detection as liars find it harder than truth tellers to 
cope with these additional requests (Vrij, 2014; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & Brankaert, 
2015).  In the present experiment, we examined whether imposing cognitive load can 
also deter people from lying.  Cues to deceit have been examined in hundreds of 
studies (DePaulo et al., 2003) and dozens of studies have investigated whether cues to 
deceit can be elicited through using specific interview styles (Vrij & Granhag, 2012).  
However, to our knowledge, research into the deterrence of deception is scarce and no 
study to date has examined whether employing specific interview techniques can deter 
people from lying. 
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There is evidence from various sources that, in interview settings (rather than daily life 
situations), lying is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth.  First, in real-life 
(videotaped) police/suspect interviews with interviewees suspected of murder, rape, 
and/or arson, liars displayed mainly cognitive cues to deceit (Mann, Vrij, & Bull, 2002).  
Second, police officers who saw a selection of these police interviews (but did not know 
when the suspects were lying or truth telling) reported that the suspects appeared to be 
thinking harder when they lied than when they told the truth (Mann & Vrij, 2006).  Third, 
when completing self-reports after a deception experiment, liars indicated that they had 
to think harder than truth tellers (e.g., Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006).  
Fourth, fMRI research has demonstrated that lying is more cognitively demanding than 
truth telling (Christ, Zan Essene, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009).  
Liars, who require more cognitive resources than truth tellers, will have fewer cognitive 
resources left over.  If cognitive demand is further raised, which could be achieved by 
making additional requests, liars are less able than truth tellers to cope with these addi-
tional requests.  Cognitive load can be imposed in numerous ways, including asking the 
interviewee to report an event in reverse order (Evans, et al., 2013), to maintain eye 
contact with the interviewer (Vrij, et al., 2010), to grip an object for some time (Debey, et 
al., 2012), or, when multiple interviewees are interviewed collectively, through forced 
turn taking (Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Hillman, in 2014).  These experiments 
revealed that imposing cognitive load elicits cognitive cues to deceit (e.g., lack of detail, 
consistency and plausibility, and a lower response rate) improving the opportunity to 
correctly classify truth tellers and liars. 
Liars prefer to stay close to the truth, for example, preferring to embed their lie in an 
otherwise truthful story (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013; Vrij, 2008).  Liars do this as a 
result of several concerns they may have.  They may be concerned that they lack the 
imagination to fabricate lies that are detailed enough and sound plausible enough; that 
their lies give away leads to investigators; or that they will forget the lies they have told 
(Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012; Vrij, 2008).  With those concerns in mind, staying close to 
the truth by embedding a lie in an otherwise truthful event (e.g., describing a truthful 
experience but lying about when this experience took place) is a rational and logical 
option.  These concerns, however, may be strengthened if the interview setting 
becomes more demanding.  The result could be that interviewees stay even closer to 
the truth and, eventually, refrain from lying.  
There are numerous settings where deterring people from lying is beneficial, perhaps 
even more so in situations where people find it acceptable to lie and frequently do so, 
despite the fact that lying could have detrimental effects.  An example of such a setting 
is a selection interview.  When undergraduate students were interviewed, 83% said they 
would lie in order to get a job (Robinson, Shepherd, & Heywood, 1998).  These students 
said that it was wrong to lie to best friends but saw nothing wrong in lying to secure a 
job.  They also thought that employers expected candidates to exaggerate qualities 
when applying.  Lies told in selection interviews range from providing false details of 
personal skills and qualities to exaggerated experience and previous salary (Birkeland, 
Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; King, 2006).  In the present experiment  
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we examined whether we could deter people from lying in a job interview through 
imposing cognitive load. 
We imposed cognitive load by asking interviewees in the imposing-cognitive-load condi-
tion to carry out two tasks at the same time.  Doing two tasks simultaneously is more 
cognitively demanding than doing one task, as it requires dividing attention between the 
two tasks (Johnston, Greenberg, Fisher, & Martin, 1970; Smith, 1969).  The job applica-
tion interview in Experiment 1 consisted of a series of specific questions followed by one 
open-ended question that gave an adequate closure to the interview.  We expected dif-
ferent results for the two types of question.  It is relatively easy to lie to the specific 
questions (e.g., ‘Do you have any postgraduate qualifications?’) as the question gives a 
strong hint of what topic to lie about (e.g., postgraduate qualifications), and the answer 
can be short.  It is relatively difficult however to lie to the open-ended question ‘Given 
our person specification, what makes you suitable for this role and why should we give 
the job to you?’) as the question does not contain a hint about what to lie about and 
requires a longer answer (Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006).  In addition, when short answers 
can be given, interviewees can separate the two tasks by first paying attention to one 
task (for example, to answer the specific question) followed by the other task (for exam-
ple, responding to the multiple-choice task).  This tactic is not possible when answering 
the open-ended question and in that situation the two tasks are more intertwined and, 
hence, more difficult to carry out.  Given that lying to the specific questions is not so dif-
ficult, differences in lying between the imposing-cognitive-load and control conditions 
are unlikely to occur.  Given that lying to the open-ended question is more difficult, we 
expect more interviewees to refrain from lying in the imposing-cognitive-load condition 
than in the control condition.  In Experiment 2 we sought to replicate this finding 
regarding the open-ended question. 
In alignment with our hypothesis van ‘t Veer, Stel and van Beest (2014) recently found 
that imposing cognitive load deters people from lying.  In their study, participants rolled 
a die and reported the outcomes while under low or high cognitive load (memorizing a 
string of eight letters).  The higher the score they reported, the more money they could 
earn.  The reported outcomes under low cognitive load were significantly higher than 
those under high cognitive load, suggesting that the participants under low cognitive 
load lied to get a higher pay.  Although the study showed that imposing cognitive load 
deters people from lying, it does not show that certain interview techniques lead to the 
same result, which was the topic of investigation in the current experiment. 
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Method 
 
Participants  
 
A total of 83 participants took part, of whom 49 (58%) were female.  Their average age 
was M = 28.01 (SD = 10.84). 
Procedure 
 
Participants were recruited via online advertisements on the University’s staff and stu-
dent portals.  As we wanted participants who dared to lie, the advertisement contained 
the heading ‘Can you blag (con) your way into a top job?’ 
 
On arrival, the participants were first asked to honestly complete a pre-interview ques-
tionnaire measuring their qualifications and experience (GCSE results, A/As level 
results, under/postgraduate degree, study topic, other qualifications [e.g., driving, first 
aid, diving, aviation licenses], speaking foreign languages, and work experience includ-
ing any managerial experience).  
 
They were then told that they were going to take part in a role-play exercise and were 
going to apply for a job to become an MI5 agent, and that they would shortly be shown 
a person specification for this job.  The participants were then told that this job specifi-
cation asks for qualifications/experience beyond that of a typical undergraduate student, 
and that, in order to get shortlisted, they would need to lie or exaggerate their attributes 
as they currently stand.  The participants were also told that the study investigated the 
use of some new interviewing software.  The software is designed to automatically con-
duct an interview and assess whether the applicant is lying or telling the truth in his or 
her responses.  The participants were then told that, if they truthfully responded to the 
questions, and the software believed their responses, they would receive £5, but most 
likely would not be shortlisted or selected for the job.  If they exaggerated or embel-
lished the truth, there is a chance that they would receive £10 if shortlisted, or even £15 
if they are really good and get the job.  But they would need to be convincing or they 
would run the risk of not fooling the software.  Participants were informed that their 
responses would be audio-recorded but not video-recorded and that the software 
worked on speech and vocal content only. 
 
The participants were then informed that, to start the interview, they would have to 
press a specific button on the computer and that they would then hear the questions to 
which they should respond orally.  
 
Additional information was given to participants in the imposing-cognitive-load condition.  
They were told that being an MI5 agent requires effective ability to multi-task, and that 
they therefore would take part in a simultaneous memory task.  In order to qualify for 
payment they would need to also pass the memory task without it affecting their perfor-
mance in the interview.  The memory task comprised reading a statement about their 
‘cover’ as an agent, which they needed to memorize.  Throughout the interview multiple- 
  
Deterrence of Deception  
OAJFP – ISSN 1948-5115 – Volume 7 . 2015 
94 
choice questions would appear relating to the memorized information, which partici-
pants needed to answer within 10 seconds before the opportunity to answer disap-
peared.  Participants were told not to delay responding to the interview questions, as 
this would affect whether the software judged them as truthful or not.  
 
Participants were then shown the job specification and told they had as much time as 
they wanted to examine it.  The person specification was for an MI5 account handler 
and included desired requirements that the participants were unlikely to possess (e.g., 
maths degree, Ph.D., fluent in many languages, living abroad, managerial experience).  
The interviewees in the control condition (M = 2.93, SD = 1.30, 95% CI [2.52, 3.34]) and 
imposing-cognitive-load condition (M = 3.22, SD = 1.35, 95% CI [2.81, 3.63]) actually 
possessed a similar number of requirements mentioned in the job specification, F(1, 81) 
= 1.00, p = .32, d =  .22.  
 
When the participant indicated that he or she was ready, the experimenter took the per-
son specification from the participant, explained again briefly the instructions as appro-
priate for each condition, and started the laptop program.  Each condition commenced 
with an initial screen with basic instructions about how to start the interview, which par-
ticipants did once the experimenter had left the room.  For control participants (N = 43) 
the interview commenced as soon as they pressed the start button.  For experimental 
participants (N = 40) a vignette with the information they needed to memorise first 
appeared on the screen.  This remained on the screen for three minutes (with a time-
counter in one corner of the screen) which was plenty of time to memorise the infor-
mation (this was established through pilot testing).  Once the three minutes had 
elapsed, then the interview commenced for experimental participants as it had done for 
control participants.  The vignette statement was about a person the agent supposedly 
knew and included detailed background information about how they had met and knew 
each other.  
 
The job interview contained ten questions.  Nine of those were specific questions and 
covered the same issues as mentioned in the job specification and the pre-interview 
questionnaire, which the participants completed at the beginning of the experiment 
(questions about their under/postgraduate degree, other qualifications [e.g., driving, first 
aid, diving, aviation license], speaking foreign languages, living abroad, job history, 
managerial experience). The final question was an open-ended question:  ‘Given our 
person specification, what makes you suitable for this role and why should we give the 
job to you?’  
 
Participants in the control condition just answered the ten interview questions, whereas 
participants in the imposing-cognitive-load condition also had to answer the ten multiple-
choice questions about the memorized information (within 10 seconds of it appearing on 
the screen), which appeared on the screen five seconds after each of the interview 
questions was asked (so participants were either listening still to the question being 
asked in the case of a long question, or were just commencing their response by the 
time the written multiple-choice question appeared on the screen).  If participants did 
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not answer within the ten-second period, the multiple question and answer facility dis-
appeared and their answer was recorded as ‘inaccurate.’  
 
After the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire.  In this ques-
tionnaire, they were first presented with a list of all the questions they had been asked in 
the interview and asked to what extent they had actually lied or told the truth to each 
one on 7-Point Likert scales ranging from [1] I told the truth completely to [7] I told an 
outright lie.  This is called the ‘Did lie’ variable, and was, for the specific questions, the 
average score across the specific questions.  They were then presented with the list of 
questions again preceded by the following text:  ‘Perhaps you intended to lie to a ques-
tion and when it came to it, you instead told the truth?  Or vice versa, perhaps you 
intended being truthful to a question and instead lied?  Did you plan to tell the truth or lie 
to the following questions below that you were asked in the interview?’  Answers were 
given on 7-point Likert scales ranging from [1] I did plan to tell the truth completely to [7] 
I did plan to tell an outright lie.  This is called the ‘Intention to lie’ variable, and was, for 
the specific questions, the average score across the specific questions.  
 
Participants were fully debriefed after the study, and, in this debriefing, it was explained 
to them that the ‘interviewing software program’ did not possess any complicated ability 
to detect lies as they had been led to believe; more that the data the program had col-
lected would have to be analyzed and so all participants would receive the full award of 
£15 for their participation. 
 
Coding.  The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.  One coder read the 
transcripts and recorded the qualifications the participant claimed to have when 
answering the specific questions.  A second coder did this for a sample of 25 tran-
scripts.  The inter-rater reliability was high with Kappas ranging from .78 (e.g., fluent in 
foreign languages) to 1.00 (e.g., experience as a manager).  The answers given to 
these specific questions were then compared with the answers given in the pre-
interview questionnaire to determine whether the participant had been lying.  
 
One coder also counted the number of qualifications the participants reported in the 
open-ended question about their suitability for the job.  A second coder also did this for 
a sample of 25 transcripts.  The inter-rater reliability (Kappa) was high and ranged from 
.83 (e.g., IT skills) to 1.00 (e.g., fluent in languages).  The answer given to the open-
ended question was then compared with the answers given in the pre-interview ques-
tionnaire to determine whether the participant had been lying. 
 
We computed several variables.  First, we examined the percentages of participants 
who lied (reported to possess at least one job criterion they did not possess) and told 
the truth (did not lie about any job criteria).  Second, we calculated the number of lies 
participants told (number of job criteria they claimed to possess when they did not actu-
ally possess those criteria).  Third, we calculated the percentage of lies they told (num-
ber of job criteria they falsely claimed to possess/ number of job criteria they falsely 
claimed to possess and number of job criteria they accurately claimed to possess).  
 
Deterrence of Deception  
OAJFP – ISSN 1948-5115 – Volume 7 . 2015 
96 
The Method section describes in detail how the study was conducted, including con-
ceptual and operational definitions of the variables used in the study.  It is both conven-
tional and expedient to divide the Method section into labeled subsections.   
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check.  The participants in the imposing-cognitive-load condition gave, 
on average, M = 7.78 (SD = 1.73) correct answers to the ten multiple-choice questions 
about the memory task.  It took them, on average, M = 7.27 seconds (SD = 3.19) to 
answer such a question.  These results indicate that participants paid serious attention 
to the multiple-choice task. 
Table 1. Results of Experiment 1 as a Function of Imposing Cognitive Load 
   Control Imposing cognitive load   
Intention to lie (post-interview questionnaire, 7-point Likert scale) 
 M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Specific questioning 3.57 1.34 3.09, 4.05 3.64 1.78 3.15, 
4.12 
.04 .845 .05 
Open-ended question 3.91 2.4 3.14, 4.53 3.91 2.4 3.20, 
4.60 
.02 .889 .05 
Did lie (post-interview questionnaire, 7-point Likert scale) 
Specific questioning 3.27 1.44 2.81, 3.74 3.64 1.60 3.16, 
4.11 
1.19 .279 .25 
Open-ended question 3.90 2.12 3.26, 4.55 3.93 2.16 3.27, 
4.58 
.002 .962 .01 
Percentage of participants who lied (deterrence to lie) 
 %   %   X2 p phi 
Specific questioning 95%   95%   .001 .980 .00 
Open-ended question 50%   24%   5.82 .016 .27 
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Number of criteria mentioned, lied 
 M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Specific questioning 3.21 2.0
4 
2.55, 3.88 3.36 2.26 2.70, 
4.03 
.10 .749 .07 
Open-ended question 1.12 1.6
1 
.71, 1.53 .49 1.00 .07, .90 4.57 .036 .54 
Percentage of criteria lied about  
Specific questioning .58 .25 .50, .65 .52 .24 .44, .60 1.10 .298 .16 
Open-ended question .35 .42 .24, .47 .18 .34 .06, .30 4.27 .040 .57 
 
(Deterrence of) Deception.  All the statistical results of the experiment are summarized 
in Table 1.  The mean scores of the ‘intention to lie’ and ‘did lie’ variables (all between 
3.27 and 3.93 on 7-point Likert scales) showed that participants reported a moderate 
intention to lie and reported that they did actually lie modestly during the interview.  No 
differences between the control and imposing-cognitive-load conditions emerged for 
these two variables.  
 
Regarding participants’ actual behaviour, a 2 (Question Type) X 2 (Imposing Cognitive 
Load) ANOVA with the decision to lie as dependent variable revealed significant main 
effects for Question Type, F(1, 81) = 108.18, p < .001, eta2 = .57, and Imposing Cogni-
tive Load, F(1, 81) = 4.87, p = .03, eta2 = .057, and a significant Question Type X 
Imposing Cognitive Load interaction effect, F(1, 81) = 5.23, p = .025, eta2 = .06.  (See 
Lunney (1970) for a justification for using analysis of variance with a dichotomous 
dependent variable.)  The interaction effect is the most informative effect and is there-
fore the only one we discuss.  Simple contrasts tests (see Table 1) revealed that, in the 
specific questioning part of the interview, virtually all interviewees (95% in the control 
condition and 95% in the imposing-cognitive-load condition) reported at least one quali-
fication they did not actually possess.  In the open-ended question part of the interview, 
significantly fewer participants in the imposing-cognitive-load condition (24%) than in the 
control condition (50%) reported at least one qualification they did not actually possess. 
 
Regarding the number of reported job criteria that the participant lied about in response 
to the open-ended question, simple contrasts tests (see Table 1) revealed that partici-
pants in the imposing-cognitive-load condition lied significantly less (M = .49) than par-
ticipants in the control condition (M = 1.12).  However, there was no difference in the 
number of lies told in the imposing-cognitive-load (M = 3.36) and control (M = 3.21) 
conditions in response to the specific questions.  Regarding the percentages of lies par-
ticipants told (number of lies/number of lies and truths) participants in the imposing- 
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cognitive-load condition told a significantly lower percentage of lies in answer to the 
open-ended question (18%) than participants in the control condition (35%).  However, 
there was no difference in the percentage of lies told in the imposing cognitive load 
(52%) and control (58%) conditions in response to the specific questions.  
 
Discussion 
 
We examined whether imposing load in an interview setting deters people from lying.  
Imposing cognitive load yielded no success in the specific questioning part of the inter-
view.  Almost everyone (95%) lied to some extent when answering these specific ques-
tions.  Of course, the participants knew that the interview was not real and so it could be 
argued that lying was condoned.  Yet, the findings are in alignment with research 
showing that people are willing to lie in selection interviews and find it acceptable to do 
so.  It is also in alignment with Ariely’s (2012) conclusion that almost everyone is dis-
honest to achieve personal gain given the opportunity.  The opportunity was certainly 
present as lying to one or more of the specific questions was not difficult.  
 
Imposing cognitive load did deter people from lying when answering the open-ended 
question about the suitability for the job:  Fifty percent of the interviewees lied in the 
control condition versus 24% in the imposing-cognitive-load condition.  When we 
examined the number of lies the participants told, we found that participants in the 
imposing-cognitive-load condition reported fewer job criteria that they did not actually 
possess in answer to the open-ended question than participants in the control condition, 
again showing that imposing cognitive load deters people from lying.  Importantly, par-
ticipants in the imposing-cognitive-load condition also told a smaller percentage of lies 
than participants in the control condition, suggesting that deterring from lying did not 
happen at the expense of truth telling.  Therefore, we can conclude that imposing cog-
nitive load not only elicits cues to deceit and facilitates lie detection (as shown in previ-
ous studies), it also deters people from lying. 
 
The participants’ self-reports about their intention to lie and the actual lies they told did 
not show differences between the control and imposing-cognitive-load conditions.  This 
is an interesting finding as it goes against what actually happened in the interview, as 
participants actually lied less in the imposing-cognitive-load condition than in the control 
condition.  This raises the question of why participants lied less in the imposing-
cognitive-load condition whereas their self-reports did not indicate this.  Perhaps these 
self-reports were unreliable, which cannot be ruled out given well documented limits of 
people’s introspective abilities (Nisbett, & Wilson, 1977).  In case the self-reports were 
reliable, the findings suggest that lying less in the imposing-cognitive-load condition was 
not deliberate, which could have been the result of cognitive resources being too 
depleted to lie.  One could argue that a non-deliberate deterrence is beneficial as it will 
make interviewees less likely to try to counteract the effect, as they do not realise that it 
is occurring.  A non-deliberate deterrence also makes it less likely that interviewees will 
feel manipulated.  
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One methodological issue merits attention.  The open-ended question always followed 
the specific questions.  Although we felt that this suited the interview protocol well (the 
open-ended question gave a nice closure to the interview), we acknowledge that, for 
methodological reasons, it would have been better if some participants would have 
answered the open-ended question first.  At present we cannot rule out that the signifi-
cant effect on the open-ended question occurred because it followed the specific ques-
tions.  We therefore re-ran the experiment but this time we only asked the open-ended 
question.  
 
In Experiment 2 we also addressed the issue raised above as to why participants lied 
less in the imposing-cognitive-load condition.  We asked them after the interview 
whether they thought about the job criteria during the interview, could still remember 
these criteria, forgot to lie, or found it too difficult to lie.  
 
Method Experiment 2 
Participants  
 
The sample consisted of 80 students and staff members from the University of Ports-
mouth, 36 males and 44 females.  Their average age was M = 21.98 years (SD = 4.04, 
range from 18 to 40).  All participants provided written consent before taking part in the 
study.  
 
Procedure  
 
The Procedure was the same as used in Experiment 1 with one difference--the inter-
view comprised a single question:  “Given our person specification, what makes you 
suitable for this role and why should we give the job to you?”  Participants responded 
verbally to this question by telling the truth or lying about their current attributes.  For 
interviewees in the experimental condition, every five to twenty seconds a randomized 
multiple-choice question would pop-up relating to the information previously memorized 
in the vignette.  These questions were shown on the computer screen whilst the partici-
pants answered the open-ended interview question about their suitability for the job as 
an MI5 Agent Handler.  These multiple-choice questions each arose for a period of ten 
seconds, before they disappeared from the screen automatically.  
 
The interviewees in the control condition (n = 40, M = 2.45, SD = 1.68, 95% CI [1.97, 
3.00]) and imposing-cognitive-load condition (n = 40, M = 2.95, SD = 2.06, 95% CI 
[2.32, 3.61]) actually possessed a similar number of required criteria mentioned in the 
job specification, F(1,78) = 1.414, p = .24, d = 0.27.  
 
After finishing the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire.  In 
this questionnaire they answered if, and if so to what extent, they had lied or told the 
truth about the requirements of the person specification on a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (I told the truth completely) to 7 (I told an outright lie).  Furthermore, participants 
were asked to what extent they had planned to tell the truth or lie about the desired cri-
teria on the person specification prior to the interview, again on a 7-point Likert scale 
Deterrence of Deception  
OAJFP – ISSN 1948-5115 – Volume 7 . 2015 
100 
ranging from 1 (I did plan to tell the truth completely) to 7 (I did plan to tell an outright 
lie).  We also asked the participants to what extent they (i) thought about the job specifi-
cation criteria while answering the open-ended question (on a scale ranging from 1 
[never] to 7 [throughout]), and (ii) could actually remember these criteria during the 
interview (on a scale from 1 [not very well] to 7 [very well]).  We finally asked the partici-
pants to what extent the statements “I had planned to tell some lies, but during the 
interview I forgot to report them” and “I had planned to tell some lies, but I found the 
interview setting too difficult to report them” applied to them, ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 7 (very much so).  
 
The same dependent variables as in Experiment 1 were computed:  (i) The percentages 
of participants who lied (reported to possess at least one job criterion they did not pos-
sess) and told the truth (did not lie about any job criteria), (ii) The number of lies partici-
pants told (number of job criteria they claimed to possess when they did not actually 
possess those criteria), and (iii) The percentage of lies they told (number of job criteria 
they falsely claimed to possess/ number of job criteria they falsely claimed to possess 
and number of job criteria they accurately claimed to possess). 
 
Results, Experiment 2 
 
Manipulation Check.  Interviewees in the imposing-load condition gave, on average, 
6.93 (SD = 2.60) correct answers to the ten multiple-choice questions about the memory 
task.  On average, the participants needed 5.69 (SD = 3.23) seconds to answer these 
questions.  These results indicate that the participants paid serious attention to the mul-
tiple-choice questions. 
 
 Table 2. Results of Experiment 2 as a Function of Imposing Cognitive Load 
 
 Control Imposing cognitive load  
Intention to lie (post-interview questionnaire, 7-point Likert scale) 
 M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Open-ended 
question 
3.38 1.58 2.89, 3.89 3.58 1.57 3.11, 4.07 .331 .56
6 
.13 
Did lie (post-interview questionnaire, 7-point Likert scale) 
Open-ended 
question 
2.79 1.08 2.45, 3.14 2.93 1.25 2.55, 3.37 .264 .60
9 
.12 
Percentage of participants who lied (deterrence to lie) 
 %   %   X2 p phi 
Open-ended 
question 
95%   100%   2.05 .15 .16 
Number of criteria mentioned, lied 
 M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p d 
Open-ended 
question 
4.95 2.61 4.07, 5.71 4.80 2.39 4.11, 5.69 .07 .79 .06 
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Percentage of criteria lied about  
Open-ended 
question 
.73 .25 .66, .81 .69 .22 .61, .76 .70 .40 .17 
Self-Reports 
Thought about the 
job criteria 
throughout the 
interview 
5.05 1.60 4.56, 5.53 4.65 1.49 4.16, 5.14 1.34 .25 .26 
Can still remember 
the job criteria 
3.32 1.49 2.87, 3.78 3.85 1.37 3.40, 4.31 2.69 .11 .38 
Planning to lie, but 
forgot to lie 
4.55 1.75 4.01, 5.09 4.20 1.68 3.66, 4.74 .83 .37 .20 
Planning to lie, but 
found it too difficult 
to lie  
3.60 1.88 3.05, 4.15 3.75 1.61 3.20, 4.30 .15 .70 .09 
 
 (Deterrence of) Deception.  All the statistical results of the experiment are summa-
rized in Table 2.  One-way ANOVAs with Imposing Cognitive Load (absent or present) 
as the only factor were carried out on most of the dependent variables.  The mean 
scores of the ‘intention to lie’ and ‘did lie’ variables (all between 2.79 and 3.58 on 7-point 
Likert scales) showed that participants reported a moderate intention to lie and reported 
that they did actually lie modestly during the interview.  No differences between the 
control and imposing-cognitive-load conditions emerged for these two variables.  This 
replicates the findings of Experiment 1. 
 
Virtually all participants lied during the interview and a Chi-square analysis showed no 
difference in the decision to lie between the control and imposing-cognitive-load condi-
tions.  In terms of the number of lies and percentage of lies told, no differences emerged 
between the control and experimental conditions either, which means that the findings 
of Experiment 1 (imposing cognitive load deters people from lying) could not be repli-
cated.  
 
The self-reports revealed that the participants thought about the criteria during the inter-
view and could (to some extent) remember them.  The self-reports further suggest that 
participants did not find it too difficult to lie but sometimes forgot to do so.  No differ-
ences emerged in the self-reports between the control and imposing-cognitive-load 
conditions.  
Discussion 
 
The main finding of Experiment 1, that imposing cognitive load deters people from lying, 
was not replicated in Experiment 2 where no differences emerged in the frequency of 
lying between the control and imposing-cognitive-load conditions.  There are two possi-
ble explanations for this.  First, for an open-ended question to yield a significant effect it 
should be asked after specific questions are asked or, second, the open-ended question 
finding in Experiment 1 is a spook result that cannot be replicated.  In either case, it is 
probably too premature to conclude that imposing cognitive load is an effective way to 
deter people from lying in job interviews.  
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We believe that the theoretical assumption that imposing cognitive load will people deter 
from lying remains valid, also because Van ‘t Veer et al. (2014) found such an effect.  A 
possible explanation for the lack of significant effects in our experiments is that partici-
pants found it too easy to lie, even in the imposing-cognitive-load condition.  Indeed, the 
question that lying was ‘too difficult’ did not receive overwhelming support (M = around 
3.70 on a 7-point Likert scale) with no difference between the control and imposing-
cognitive-load conditions.  The idea that carrying out two tasks at once is more mentally 
taxing than carrying out each task individually is well established in the literature (John-
ston, et al., 1970; Smith, 1969), thus adding a secondary task to the act of lying should 
have made lying more difficult.  However, the act of lying was apparently not made diffi-
cult enough to deter people from lying.  Thus, to yield significant effects the act of lying 
itself needs to be made more difficult.  A straightforward way of doing this is asking par-
ticipants to elaborate on their stories (‘You say you speak three foreign languages, 
please say something in each of these three languages?’). 
 
Some methodological issues of the two experiments merit attention.  First, we stated 
that participants honestly completed a pre-interview questionnaire.  Of course, we can 
never be certain that they were completely honest but we have no reason to believe that 
they were not.  At the initial stage of the study participants were not aware of the 
experimental design or what they would be asked to do during the study, so we have no 
reason to believe that they would be dishonest.  Second, we did not have measures of 
cognitive load.  Since it is well established that carrying out two tasks at once is more 
mentally taxing than carrying out each task individually we did not see the need to 
examine it in the present experiment.  Future experiments could examine this, for 
example by using deception tasks that require immediate responses so that reaction 
times (a reliable measure of cognitive load, Verschuere, and De Houwer, 2011) can be 
measured.  Third, participants knew that they were not really applying to work at MI5 
and that this was role-play.  Such role-play is very common in deception research.  For 
example, in many studies participants are instructed to ‘steal’ money and then asked to 
deny it in an interview.  Participants in such studies are well aware that if they fail to be 
convincing in their interview they will not be arrested for stealing money. 
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